Understanding Indiana’s Risk Assessment System (IRAS) and Bail Reform

Understanding Indiana’s Risk Assessment System (IRAS) and Bail Reform

Introduction: Bail Reform Across the States

In recent years, many U.S. states have overhauled their bail systems to prioritize fairness and public safety. Traditional cash bail often meant that low-risk defendants languished in jail pretrial only because they couldn’t afford bail, while wealthier but higher-risk individuals walked free​.

To address this, jurisdictions like New Jersey, Kentucky, and New York have implemented evidence-based pretrial reforms. New Jersey, for example, virtually eliminated cash bail in 2017 and adopted a risk assessment model; as a result, the state’s pretrial jail population dropped by about 20% from 2015 to 2022 with no increase in crime. ​Kentucky’s use of a statewide risk tool similarly increased release rates and court appearance rates while reducing new criminal activity by 15%​. These reforms aim to ensure that release decisions hinge on a defendant’s risk level rather than their bank account, upholding the principle of innocent until proven guilty.

At their core, bail reforms seek to protect the public and honor defendants’ rights simultaneously. States experimenting with risk-based release report high court appearance rates (often around 90% or more) and low rates of re-offense during pretrial​.

 By replacing or limiting cash bail, they strive to reduce pretrial detention of low-risk individuals, eliminate the inequity of “wealth-based” jailing, and focus detention resources on those who pose a true danger or flight risk. Critics of these reforms, however, caution that risk assessment tools must be used carefully to avoid potential biases and unintended consequences. Nonetheless, the trend is clear: from New Jersey’s sweeping bail overhaul to smaller pilot programs in cities and counties, the justice system is embracing evidence-based pretrial practices.

Indiana is one such state at the forefront of this movement. After observing reforms elsewhere and conducting local pilot projects, Indiana launched its own risk-based pretrial release system. The Indiana Supreme Court enacted Criminal Rule 26 to standardize pretrial release decisions, and the state adopted the Indiana Risk Assessment System (IRAS) as a tool to guide those decisions. The remainder of this blog will delve into Indiana’s specific approach – explaining in detail how IRAS functions from the moment of an accused person’s arrest through the completion of their sentence. We’ll cover the role of pretrial risk assessments under Criminal Rule 26, how the IRAS Pretrial Assessment Tool (IRAS-PAT) evaluates risk, its influence on release and bail decisions, and what studies and case examples reveal about the system’s effectiveness. We will also critically examine the pros and cons of IRAS, including its success in reducing unnecessary detention, concerns about fairness and implementation, and the financial burdens that can accompany alternative release programs (sometimes dubbed “Bail Jail”).

Indiana’s Pretrial Reform: Criminal Rule 26 and Risk-Based Release

Indiana’s effort to reform bail practices culminated in Criminal Rule 26, adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court in 2016 and effective statewide as of January 2020​.

Rule 26 established a presumption in favor of pretrial release without cash bail for many defendants. In essence, if an arrestee does not pose a substantial risk of flight or danger, the court “should release” them without requiring money bail or surety.

This marked a significant shift away from the old system where bail amounts were often dictated by charge-based schedules. The rule has a few narrow exceptions – it does not apply if the person is charged with murder or treason, or if they were already on pretrial release, probation, parole, or other community supervision at the time of the new arrest​. . In those situations, judges have more discretion and may impose bail or hold the defendant. Outside of those exceptions, Rule 26 directs courts to favor release, with appropriate conditions as needed, instead of automatically setting a cash bond.

Under Rule 26, Indiana courts must consider evidence-based risk information when making pretrial decisions. Section (B) of the rule explicitly instructs judges to “utilize the results of an evidence-based risk assessment” approved by the Office of Court Services, along with any other relevant information about the defendant, to determine if they pose a substantial flight or safety risk​.

 In practical terms, this means that shortly after arrest (often before or at the initial hearing), defendants are assessed using a standardized tool – the IRAS Pretrial Assessment Tool (IRAS-PAT) – to gauge their risk of failing to appear in court or being arrested for a new offense if released. The outcome of that assessment informs whether the person should be released on their own recognizance, released with conditions (such as supervision or electronic monitoring), or held on a monetary bail. Notably, Rule 26 does not eliminate judges’ discretion entirely; a judge can still require bail or detain a defendant deemed low-risk if there are other compelling factors, and conversely, can release a higher-risk defendant if circumstances warrant. But the rule creates a strong default expectation of release for low-risk individuals​, effectively flipping the script on Indiana’s pretrial practices to a “risk-informed” model​.

 Under Rule 26(B), judges must consider an evidence-based pretrial risk assessment when making release decisions. This rule was piloted in several counties and is credited with making pretrial release decisions more fair and consistent across Indiana, as it shifts the focus to a defendant’s risk level rather than their ability to pay. It laid the groundwork for Indiana’s broader pretrial initiative, which aims to maximize public safety, court appearance, and the appropriate release of defendants awaiting trial.

The intent behind Criminal Rule 26 is clear: to detain the right people (those who truly pose threats or are likely to abscond) and to avoid jailing those who can safely remain in the community pretrial. This aligns with national best practices and constitutional principles​.

After the rule’s adoption, Indiana formed working groups and pilot programs to figure out the best processes for implementation. For example, Marion County (Indianapolis) began preparing in 2018 by creating a Pretrial Services Unit and developing a locally tailored release matrix to go along with the IRAS risk scores​.

By the time Rule 26 took effect statewide in 2020, many counties had already been experimenting with risk assessments and tweaking their procedures for several years. Today, each Indiana county is expected to use the IRAS-PAT for eligible arrestees and follow Rule 26’s guidance. More than 50 counties have established certified pretrial services programs or are working toward certification with the state, while even those without formal programs are generally adopting key practices.

One important aspect of Rule 26 is the handling of information gathered during the risk assessment. Recognizing that defendants are interviewed soon after arrest for the IRAS-PAT, Rule 26 includes safeguards for those statements. Specifically, any information a defendant provides as part of a risk assessment interview cannot be used against them in the prosecution of their case – such statements are inadmissible at trial (except in limited circumstances like a perjury charge or other pretrial proceedings)​. This encourages candid responses during the assessment without fear of self-incrimination. Rule 26 also allows that if conducting the risk assessment would unreasonably delay a release (for instance, if staff aren’t immediately available), the court isn’t forced to wait on it to release a clearly low-risk defendant​.

However, in most cases the assessment is done promptly. Indeed, failing to perform or consider the IRAS assessment when required can be deemed an abuse of discretion: in one 2021 appellate case, the Indiana Court of Appeals vacated a trial court’s bail decision for not ordering and reviewing an IRAS-PAT report as mandated by Rule 26​. This underscores that the risk assessment is now a crucial piece of the pretrial puzzle in Indiana.

The Indiana Risk Assessment System (IRAS): From Arrest to Sentencing

To support Rule 26 and broader evidence-based practices, Indiana employs the Indiana Risk Assessment System (IRAS) – a comprehensive set of risk assessment instruments used at different stages of the criminal justice process. Developed for Indiana in partnership with criminal justice researchers at the University of Cincinnati, IRAS is actually five separate tools designed to identify an offender’s risk of reoffending and their “criminogenic needs” (factors that can be addressed to reduce future crime)​. These five tools are used at distinct points from the start of a case to its end:

Pretrial Assessment Tool (IRAS-PAT): Administered shortly after a person’s arrest (usually before the initial hearing) to assess the risk of failure to appear in court or committing a new offense if released pretrial. This is the tool most relevant to bail decisions under Rule 26 and will be discussed in depth below.

Community Supervision Screening Tool: Used post-conviction, often at the sentencing or intake to probation stage, to quickly determine if a full assessment is needed. It’s a brief screener when someone is placed on community supervision (probation).

Community Supervision Tool (IRAS-CST): A more comprehensive risk/needs assessment for individuals on probation or community corrections (post-trial). This helps probation officers craft case plans targeting the person’s specific risk factors (like substance abuse, lack of employment, etc.) during supervision​.

Institutional (Prison) Intake Tool: Administered when someone enters the state prison system, to gauge their risks and needs while incarcerated. It can inform programming and security classification in the Department of Correction.

Reentry Tool: Given as someone is preparing to re-enter the community from prison, assessing their risk of recidivism and needs upon release. This information can assist in parole decisions and post-release planning.

Together, these instruments create a continuous thread of risk assessment “from arrest through release”. At each stage, the goal is to use objective criteria to guide decisions – whether that’s deciding to release or detain pretrial, determining the level of supervision on probation, or planning reentry services. By regularly updating the assessment as a person moves through the system, Indiana aims to have current, evidence-based information to inform judicial and correctional decisions​.

In theory, this leads to more tailored interventions: for example, a high-risk probationer might be placed in a stricter program with mandatory treatment, whereas a low-risk probationer might be given minimal supervision to avoid unnecessary interference that could disrupt their stability (a principle supported by research on effective correctional practices).

The Indiana Risk Assessment System (IRAS) provides a framework of sequential tools used at key decision points in a criminal case. This visual diagram illustrates how an individual moves through the system and where each IRAS tool is applied – from the IRAS-PAT at booking, informing the initial release decision, to additional assessments if the person is convicted and placed under community supervision or sent to prison, and finally a Reentry assessment before sentence completion. By continuously evaluating risk and needs, the system helps officials decide on bail, tailor probation conditions, and plan reentry support, all with the aim of reducing recidivism.

In practice, the IRAS-PAT results accompany the defendant to their initial hearing, and if they remain in the system (either under supervision or incarceration), subsequent IRAS assessments build on that information to guide interventions at each stage.

A crucial aspect of IRAS is that it’s validated – meaning it has been tested to ensure it accurately predicts what it’s supposed to. The IRAS-PAT specifically has been validated in multiple Indiana counties, showing it reliably distinguishes between higher and lower risk defendants. In fact, a multi-county study by researchers found the IRAS-PAT’s predictive accuracy for new criminal activity and for failure-to-appear was in the “good to excellent” range (on a scale of 0 to 1, it scored about 0.67 for predicting new crimes on pretrial release and 0.71 for predicting FTA – with 0.71+ considered excellent)​.

We will discuss these results more in the effectiveness section, but it’s important to note here that the tool is grounded in Indiana data. The state also continually refines the tools; the Office of Court Services has coordinated ongoing validation studies in numerous counties (Allen, Hamilton, Hendricks, Monroe, and others) to check that IRAS-PAT works as intended locally​. This research-based approach is what makes the system “evidence-based” as required by law​.

IRAS-PAT: How the Pretrial Assessment Tool Works

The IRAS Pretrial Assessment Tool (IRAS-PAT) is the linchpin of Indiana’s pretrial reform. This tool is a brief interview and record-check conducted by pretrial services (often probation officers trained for this task) to evaluate a defendant’s risk level shortly after arrest. The IRAS-PAT examines seven key factors that research has linked to pretrial misconduct (missing court or reoffending). These seven items cover both a person’s criminal history and their current life circumstances. According to Indiana’s risk assessment manual, the IRAS-PAT “contains seven items for evaluating the likelihood someone will fail to appear or reoffend while on pre-trial supervision,” focusing on criminal history, employment, residential stability, and substance use.

Each item is scored numerically, and the sum corresponds to a risk category: Low, Moderate, or High risk. The seven IRAS-PAT factors can be summarized as follows​

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1. Age at First Arrest: Defendants who had their first arrest at a younger age tend to be at higher risk. (For example, age 32 or younger at first arrest scores higher risk​

2. Failure to Appear History (last 24 months): The number of times the person had a warrant for failing to appear in court in the past two years. (No recent FTA = low risk points; multiple recent FTAs = higher risk)​

3. Prior Incarcerations: Whether the person has had 3 or more prior jail or prison incarcerations (not counting mere arrests or short detentions). Multiple past incarcerations indicate a higher risk​

4. Employment Status: Was the defendant employed at the time of arrest? Steady full-time employment (or being a full-time student/disabled/retired) is scored as low risk, while unemployment or very limited, inconsistent work is higher risk​

5. Residential Stability: Has the defendant lived at a stable residence for the past 6 months? Living in one place (or other stable arrangement) scores low risk; transient or unstable housing (homelessness, frequently moving) scores higher​

6. Recent Illicit Drug Use: Defendant’s self-reported (or verified) use of illegal drugs in the last 6 months. Recent drug use adds a risk point​ (Note: this does not penalize someone for using alcohol or prescribed meds as directed – it’s focused on illicit substance use).

7. Severe Drug Problems: Whether the person has experienced serious problems related to drug use in the last 6 months (such as health, legal, or major life disruptions due to drugs). If yes, that adds risk points; if they either haven’t used or have had no serious drug-related issues recently, they score low on this item​.

Each factor is scored 0 (no risk factor present) or 1 (risk factor present), except two factors (FTA warrants and employment) which can score up to 2 points depending on the situation​. The points are totaled to produce an overall risk score ranging roughly from 0 (lowest risk) up to 8 or 9 (highest risk). Based on that total, the tool classifies a defendant into one of three risk categories: Low Risk, Moderate Risk, or High Risk for pretrial misconduct​.

For example, someone with no prior record, stable job and housing, and no recent drug issues would likely score Low Risk. In contrast, someone with multiple prior jail stints, recent FTAs, and unemployment might score as High Risk.

It’s important to emphasize that the IRAS-PAT is designed to be quick and efficient – typically the interview and scoring take about 10–15 minutes. Pretrial officers will often review the defendant’s criminal history records (for verifying things like prior FTA warrants and convictions) and then ask the defendant standardized questions about their living situation, employment, and substance use. The officer then follows a scoring guide (like the one summarized above) to assign points for each item. Indiana requires that staff be trained and certified to administer IRAS-PAT, ensuring they use the tool consistently and correctly​.

The emphasis is on fidelity to the tool – asking the questions as intended and scoring objectively – because that’s what makes the assessment valid. The final risk category (low/moderate/high) is then reported to the court, usually in a pretrial services report available at the defendant’s initial hearing.

What does the court do with this risk score? In Indiana, many counties have adopted pretrial release matrices or guidelines that tie IRAS-PAT risk levels to recommended release options. For instance, a common framework might be: Low-risk defendants are recommended for release on their own recognizance (ROR) or unsecured bond, potentially with minimal conditions like phone check-ins or reminders; Moderate-risk defendants might be recommended for release with some supervision conditions (e.g. regular check-ins, drug testing, GPS monitoring, or participation in pretrial services programs); High-risk defendants might be recommended for a higher level of supervision or, in some cases, that bail be set to mitigate flight risk, or even detention if allowed. In Marion County’s pilot program, the pretrial working group developed a release matrix that uses the IRAS-PAT score and the severity of the charge to generate a recommendation for the judge​.

Under that system, after the IRAS interview, an officer provides a report to the court noting the defendant’s risk category and a suggested course of action (e.g., “Release with GPS monitoring” or “Hold on bond per schedule”)​. While judges are not bound to follow the recommendation, it serves as a starting point grounded in data. In practice, most judges give significant weight to the IRAS-PAT results, as Rule 26 encourages. As one Indiana judge noted, this structured approach “helps eliminate disparities in the way bond is applied, provides judges with quantifiable data to make decisions, and expedites release for low-risk offenders”​

Indeed, Marion County reports that using IRAS and these guidelines led to quicker releases—often, low-risk individuals can be identified and released within hours of arrest, rather than spending days in jail waiting for a formal bail hearing.

Of course, the risk score is not the only factor judges consider. Rule 26(B) allows courts to consider “such other information as the court finds relevant” in addition to the IRAS assessment​.

 This can include the nature of the current charges, input from the prosecution and defense, the defendant’s ties to the community (family, length of residence), and any history of violence or victim input that might not be fully captured by the IRAS questions. For example, in a serious case like a violent home-invasion burglary involving a firearm, a defendant might score Moderate on IRAS-PAT due to no prior record, but the judge could still decide that the circumstances of the crime indicate a danger to the community and thus impose a higher bond or stricter conditions. A notable case illustrating this balance is State v. DeWees (2021). In that case, an 18-year-old defendant with no prior record scored as “Moderate risk” on the IRAS-PAT after being charged as an accomplice in a home invasion. The trial court acknowledged her positive factors (strong family support, no past arrests) but denied her bond reduction, citing the extremely serious nature of the offense and the victim’s ongoing fear​.

The Court of Appeals initially reversed that decision and ordered her released on electronic home detention, but the Indiana Supreme Court later chided the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial judge’s discretion to keep the bond in place​. The Supreme Court agreed that, given the facts, the state had shown she posed a risk to public safety (the victim’s safety in particular) despite the IRAS score​. This case underscores that IRAS-PAT is a guide, not an absolute directive – judicial officers can depart from its recommendation when justified, especially in higher-stakes cases. Ideally, though, such departures are the exception rather than the norm, and the risk tool ensures that for the majority of cases the decisions are consistent and empirically grounded.

IRAS-PAT and Bail Decisions in Practice

When an accused person is arrested in Indiana today, the IRAS-PAT process is typically set in motion very quickly (often while the person is still in custody awaiting their first court appearance). Many counties have dedicated pretrial services staff or probation officers on duty to conduct assessments for new arrestees each day. For example, Monroe County decided that every arrestee – both those who remain in jail and those who might bond out immediately – should be assessed prior to initial hearing, to give the judge complete information​. Hamilton County similarly assesses all new arrestees, including those arrested on warrants, so no one “falls through the cracks” of the risk evaluation process​. In Marion County (the state’s largest jurisdiction), the volume of arrests required scaling up staff: they obtained grant funding to hire 12 full-time probation officers exclusively for pretrial assessment duties, ensuring that all individuals arrested for a felony or misdemeanor get an IRAS-PAT done before their initial hearing. (Those who are arrested on a violation of probation/parole or already have a pending case may skip the IRAS-PAT because they’re ineligible for immediate release under Rule 26’s exceptions​).

At the initial hearing (or bail hearing), the judge is provided with the IRAS-PAT results, usually in a succinct report. That pretrial services report often contains the defendant’s risk category (low/mod/high) and may include a recommendation or menu of release options. Indiana law (Indiana Code § 35-33-8-3.8) reinforces that courts should consider the results of the risk assessment when setting bail and conditions, alongside other statutory factors like the nature of the offense and criminal history.

What has changed under the IRAS system is that the default approach has flipped: instead of defaulting to a money bail amount from a schedule and requiring the defendant to pay to get out, courts now first ask, “Can we safely release this person without monetary bail?”​

 In many cases, if the IRAS-PAT shows Low risk, the judge will release the defendant on their own recognizance (ROR) or on an unsecured bond (meaning no up-front payment, just a promise to pay if they violate). Moderate-risk individuals might be released with some conditions – Indiana’s pretrial programs offer a continuum of supervision, ranging from simple text-message court reminders and periodic check-ins, up to GPS electronic monitoring or home detention for higher-risk cases​. Only if the defendant is deemed to pose a significant risk (or falls under an exception) will the court impose a secured money bail that the person must pay to be released​.

Even then, Rule 26(C) allows judges to accept a partial cash deposit for bail (for instance, 10% of the amount) with conditions, in order to not make bail an all-or-nothing proposition.

In short, IRAS-PAT scores heavily influence pretrial release decisions in Indiana. They don’t eliminate judicial discretion, but they provide an evidence-backed starting point. Many counties have reported that since adopting IRAS and Rule 26, far more defendants are being released without having to post bail, and often with better outcomes. Marion County’s data from 2019–2021 is telling: over that period, more than 2,700 defendants were supervised pretrial under the new system, and 95.2% of them made all their court appearances; likewise, 94.4% did not pick up any new offenses while on pretrial release. These are remarkably high success rates, suggesting that judges are largely releasing the right people – those who indeed will comply with court dates and stay arrest-free. It also indicates that the supervision measures (like GPS tracking or phone reminders) can effectively manage moderate-risk defendants in the community. The IRAS-PAT has helped identify which defendants can be safely trusted to return on their own, contributing to a sharp reduction in the local jail population. Judges in Marion County still retain the option to deviate from the standard practices (they can set a higher or lower bond than the schedule recommends, for example), and the prosecutor’s office can request higher bail for particular cases​. But those are exceptions – by and large, the risk assessment’s recommendation is followed.

An illustration of IRAS’s impact is the way courts handle technical violations or issues that arise during pretrial release. In the past, a missed court date or failed drug test might automatically lead to revocation of bail. Now, some counties are taking a more nuanced approach. Monroe County, for instance, deals with many pretrial violations administratively rather than revoking release or issuing an arrest warrant, unless the violation indicates a new serious threat​. If a low-risk person simply forgets a court date (and thus has an FTA), instead of immediately jailing them, pretrial officers attempt to contact the person and resolve the issue, recognizing that a single lapse doesn’t necessarily mean the person is dangerous or won’t show up in the future​. Hamilton County similarly tries not to react too harshly to “technical” violations and will work with defendants to get them back on track, reserving bond revocation for more serious breaches like a new offense. This reflects a philosophical shift enabled by having better risk information: officials know which defendants are generally reliable (so they give them the benefit of the doubt on minor hiccups) versus those who truly may be going off-track.

Of course, not all counties have identical resources or programs. By 2023, only about half of Indiana counties had fully certified pretrial services agencies​. Some smaller or more rural counties still rely on magistrates and existing probation staff to do assessments without a robust supervision program to follow. Even in those places, though, IRAS-PAT is used to inform the initial release decision (even if the only options are ROR or bail, without intermediate supervision). Over time, the expectation is that all counties will develop some pretrial services capacity so that moderate-risk defendants can be monitored or supported instead of detained or forced to post bond. The state has offered training and grants to counties to help in this rollout​.

Effectiveness of Indiana’s Pretrial Risk Assessment: Data and Outcomes

Indiana’s shift to risk-based pretrial decision-making is relatively new statewide (since 2020), but there have been studies and statistics emerging from pilot counties that shed light on how well IRAS and Rule 26 are working. Overall, the early evidence indicates several positive trends: high appearance rates, high public safety (low re-arrest) rates, and more people released pretrial, all without clear increases in crime. At the same time, researchers are continuing to examine questions of fairness (such as racial bias) and consistency in how the system is applied.

A landmark evaluation came from a 2020 study focusing on five Indiana counties (Allen, Hamilton, Hendricks, Jefferson, and Monroe) which had been early adopters of the IRAS-PAT. The study found “good-to-excellent” predictive performance of the IRAS-PAT​. In plain terms, this means the tool was doing a good job differentiating who was likely to succeed on pretrial release versus who was likely to fail. Low-risk defendants, as classified by IRAS-PAT, indeed had the lowest rates of re-arrest and FTA, while high-risk defendants had higher rates – showing the tool’s risk distinctions were meaningful.

Another study focusing on four counties (Allen, Hamilton, Hendricks, Monroe) looked at outcomes before vs. after implementing risk assessments in bail decisions. It found that with the use of IRAS, more defendants were able to secure pretrial release, which is a success in reducing pretrial detention, but it also observed a slight uptick in re-arrests on pretrial (mostly for low-level, nonviolent offenses)​. In other words, by releasing more people (including some who previously would have been detained on bail), there were a few more instances of new offenses – but notably, these were largely minor and did not involve serious violent crimes. Importantly, that same study found no evidence of racial disparity in how the tool’s recommendations were implemented – Black and white defendants had similar outcomes under the risk-guided system​. However, it also didn’t find that the tool reduced pre-existing racial disparities in pretrial detention; it simply didn’t exacerbate them. This finding is significant given national concerns about algorithmic bias: at least in this analysis, IRAS-PAT did not show bias against Black defendants in outcomes (though researchers caution that continued monitoring is needed)​.

County-level data reinforces these generally positive trends. We’ve already cited Marion County’s impressive 95% appearance rate and 94% non-arrest rate among supervised pretrial defendants​. In Monroe County, which has been a leader in pretrial reform since 2016, officials reported a 92.6% court appearance rate over a three-year span (2016–2019) after implementing IRAS-PAT and enhanced pretrial supervision. Hamilton County likewise saw its failure-to-appear rate drop to around 6.7% in 2019, down from roughly 9% in 2016​. These improvements suggest that when defendants are released with appropriate support (like reminders and check-ins), they are very likely to show up for court. It dispels the fear that eliminating cash bail would lead to a flood of fugitives – on the contrary, appearance rates seem to have improved or held steady with the new system.

Pretrial Outcomes by Risk Level in One Indiana County. Early statistics from Indiana’s pretrial programs show encouraging outcomes. For example, Elkhart County (which implemented a certified pretrial release program) tracked its results for January–June 2023. Defendants classified as High Risk by IRAS-PAT appeared for their court hearings 89% of the time, while Moderate Risk defendants had a 96% appearance rate, and Low Risk defendants achieved a 100% appearance rate (every low-risk defendant made all court dates)​

 In terms of new criminal activity during pretrial release, 75% of high-risk defendants had no new arrests or charges while out, compared to 87.5% of moderate-risk and 80% of low-risk defendants remaining arrest-free pretrial​. These data show that even among those deemed “high risk,” the majority are succeeding on pretrial release, and lower-risk individuals do exceedingly well – validating the assessment tool’s predictions and the effectiveness of appropriate pretrial monitoring. Such outcomes align with the state’s goals of maximizing public safety and court appearance while maximizing pretrial release for those who don’t need to be behind bars​.

It’s worth noting a couple of nuances in the Elkhart data: interestingly, the low-risk group had a slightly lower “no re-arrest” percentage (80%) than the moderate group (87.5%). This could be due to small sample sizes or specific circumstances (for instance, if one or two low-risk individuals out of a small group picked up a minor charge, it would pull their percentage down). Overall, all groups had relatively high success. The Prosecutor in Elkhart County, Vicki Becker, expressed that the county is “doing well” on appearances and re-arrest rates under the new system. One reason Elkhart limited their program initially to Level 6 felonies (the lowest felony level) is resource constraints – as Becker noted, “it takes a lot of time and effort to do these interviews and assessments” and to gather information for the court in each case.This highlights that while the IRAS-PAT itself is short, setting up a robust pretrial services operation requires personnel and coordination. However, as counties invest in these programs, they are seeing tangible benefits in terms of fewer people unnecessarily held in jail and positive pretrial compliance.

Statewide, Indiana’s Office of Court Services is still in the process of aggregating comprehensive data on pretrial outcomes (such as a statewide FTA rate, re-arrest rate, etc., under Rule 26). As of late 2023, the state officials indicated they were “working through the details” of collecting and analyzing that information, and full results were not yet available​. It’s a complex task to pull consistent data from 92 counties. Nonetheless, the combination of independent studies and local reports so far suggests that Indiana’s evidence-based approach is on the right track. More people are being released (anecdotal reports from various counties note declines in jail populations), and those released are overwhelmingly appearing in court and notcommitting new crimes at a higher rate than before. Additionally, one 2020 analysis specifically looked at potential racial bias in the IRAS-PAT (the “Predictive Bias Report” commissioned by the state) and found no systemic bias in how the tool predicted outcomes for Black vs. white defendants​. However, experts like Meghan Guevara of the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) caution that all such tools are built on data that may reflect societal biases – for instance, because Black men are more likely to be arrested in the first place, any tool using prior arrests as a factor could indirectly perpetuate disparities​. The PJI, once a supporter of risk assessments, has actually renounced its support for these tools, arguing that they are inherently biased and often misused (used to detain rather than just to set conditions)​. Indiana’s researchers, like Dr. Natalie Hipple and Tess Doubet Lowder who have studied IRAS-PAT, acknowledge the underlying racial disparities in criminal justice data but do not agree that using a risk tool makes those disparities worse​. They contend that one must compare outcomes with the tool to the previous system; if the old cash bail system had its own inequities, a well-implemented risk tool might actually be an improvement or at least no worse. Indiana’s ongoing data collection, including studies on differential prediction by race, will be important to continually evaluate fairness.

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Case Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses Illustrated

To further understand IRAS’s impact, let’s briefly consider a few case studies and examples from Indiana’s experience so far:

• Marion County’s Success: Marion County (Indianapolis) provides a strong example of IRAS and Rule 26 achieving their intended goals. Since fully implementing pretrial reform by late 2019, Marion County has seen a jail population decrease and excellent compliance by released defendants. Nearly all (95%+) of supervised individuals show up for court and complete the pretrial period without new arrests​. One could point to individual stories: for instance, a low-risk defendant charged with a minor felony who, under the old system, might have sat in jail because he couldn’t afford a $500 bond, is now released the next day on recognizance. He continues working his job, supports his family, and comes to court as required – an outcome beneficial to him, his community, and the taxpayer (who doesn’t have to pay to detain him). Judges in Marion County have praised the new system for speeding up release times for low-risk arrestees – some are released within 6-8 hours of booking once the assessment clears them, rather than spending days in custody​. This case illustrates the strength of IRAS: it identifies candidates for quick release, reducing unnecessary detention and its collateral harms.

• Phillip Beachey Case (2021): This Indiana Court of Appeals case highlighted the importance of following the risk assessment process. Phillip Beachey was charged with multiple serious child sex offenses in Elkhart County. The trial court initially set an extremely high surety bond ($520,000) per the local schedule without conducting an IRAS-PAT​. Beachey’s attorney requested a bond reduction and specifically a risk assessment. The trial court did order a “bond report” (presumably including an IRAS assessment) which was done and filed, but then denied the bond reduction anyway, largely citing the severity of charges and that Beachey had family out of state (potential flight concerns)​. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found the trial judge abused discretion because Indiana Code 35-33-8-3.8 and Criminal Rule 26 weren’t followed – the court hadn’t properly utilized the IRAS pretrial assessment before deciding on bail​. The COA noted that the only reason a risk assessment wasn’t “available” at the initial determination was the court’s own failure to get one​. They vacated the order and remanded for a new consideration of bail with the risk assessment in hand​. This case shines light on an implementation weakness: not all courts immediately adhered to the new requirements, especially early on. It took an appellate correction to reinforce that every eligible defendant must be assessed and that judges need to at least weigh those results. Following this case, Indiana trial courts are likely much more careful to document that they have considered IRAS results (or explain if they couldn’t obtain them). The Beachey case also raises the point that judicial discretion can still override an assessment’s implication – even with an IRAS score (which wasn’t public in the opinion, but presumably it was considered), the judge leaned on traditional factors (many serious charges, out-of-state family ties) to keep bail high. The system’s design expects judges to incorporate both the risk score and individualized factors.

• Sierra DeWees Case (2021–2022): Mentioned earlier, this case went up to the Indiana Supreme Court. Sierra DeWees was a teenager charged in a violent burglary; IRAS-PAT rated her moderate risk​. The trial court refused to lower her $50,000 bond despite the moderate score and lack of prior record, focusing on the gravity of the offense and the victim’s trauma​. The Court of Appeals disagreed and ordered her release on GPS-monitored home detention (essentially trusting that moderate risk could be managed with conditions)​. However, the Indiana Supreme Court took the case and unanimously reversed the COA, affirming the trial court’s decision to keep the bond as is​. The Supreme Court emphasized that the state had demonstrated she was a risk – pointing to risk of flight and danger to the specific victim – thus justifying the higher bond and not releasing her​. This case demonstrates a potential con of the system: even with a risk assessment, outcomes can vary depending on judicial philosophy. One could argue the COA was more aligned with the spirit of Rule 26 (release if not clearly dangerous, especially a young first-time offender, but with strict conditions in that instance), whereas the Supreme Court prioritized judicial discretion and deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of the case details. For the public, it shows the system is not a rubber-stamp algorithm – human judges will still make the final call, and sometimes that means a person assessed as moderate or low risk might still be detained if the judge sees other red flags. It’s a balance between consistency and individualized justice.

In reviewing these cases and data, the strengths of Indiana’s IRAS-based system are evident in its outcomes (high compliance, more equitable release) and the way it has professionalized the pretrial process (dedicated staff, structured decision-making). Defendants who pose little risk are no longer stuck in jail simply for being poor, and that is a significant advancement for justice. From a community perspective, focusing jail space on truly high-risk individuals should enhance public safety and save taxpayer money. Studies cited by the Maryland Attorney General’s office note that supervised pretrial release is ten times cheaper than jail, and jurisdictions that reduced money bail have saved millions while maintaining safety​. Indiana’s reforms likely yield similar cost savings by reducing the pretrial detainee population, although state-specific fiscal studies are still forthcoming.

At the same time, the weaknesses or challenges should not be glossed over. A critical concern is ensuring fairness and avoiding bias. While Indiana’s early data is reassuring on racial bias, continued transparency and independent audits of the risk tool are needed. The state is wise to commission studies like the Predictive Bias Report (2020) and Differential Prediction Report (2022)​to probe how IRAS performs across different demographic groups. Another issue is the varying speed of implementation – some counties have robust pretrial services, others less so. This can lead to uneven justice depending on where someone is arrested. The Supreme Court’s Pretrial Release Committee and IOCS are actively working to bring lagging counties up to speed​, but it’s a work in progress. Additionally, while IRAS guides judges, judicial discretion can still lead to variability. One judge might be risk-averse and detain a moderate-risk defendant out of caution, while another judge might release a high-risk defendant believing in giving a chance – the system allows both approaches within certain bounds. Training judges on the proper use of risk assessments (and the importance of not misusing the tool to justify detention beyond what the rule intends) is an ongoing need. There is a legitimate worry (raised by groups like PJI) that some jurisdictions might misuse risk scores, for example by detaining someone simply because they are “high risk” even if the law would permit release with conditions​. Indiana’s Rule 26 tries to mitigate that by its presumption of release, but the ultimate check is appellate review if judges stray too far.

Finally, an often overlooked aspect is the experience of defendants who are released under conditions. For many, being released pretrial is obviously far better than sitting in jail. However, some conditions can impose burdens – both practical and financial – on defendants. A clear example is the use of work release programs or electronic monitoring in lieu of bail, which some refer to as “Bail Jail.” In some counties, a defendant might avoid paying a large cash bond but instead be placed on GPS monitoring or in a work release center. These alternatives often come with fees. Indiana law permits courts to charge a pretrial services fee up to $100 initially, plus $15–30 per month, for defendants supervised pretrial (but only if the person can afford it and has a prior conviction)​. On top of that, specific programs can charge daily fees. For instance, in Monroe County’s Community Alternative Supervision Program, various levels of home detention and monitoring cost $6 to $16 per day in fees paid by the defendant​. Over weeks and months, these costs add up – e.g., $16/day is roughly $480 a month – which can be a hefty sum for someone of limited means, essentially creating a “pay as you go” form of bail. If a defendant cannot keep up with these payments, they risk violations or termination from the program, which could land them back in jail. This is where the term “Bail Jail” arises: the person is technically free pretrial but is confined to a program that they must pay for, blurring the line between liberty and detention. Critics argue this can perpetuate inequities, as even in a risk-based system, poorer defendants may struggle with the financial conditions of release (just in a different way than traditional bail). Indiana’s courts are aware of this issue – probation departments often assess ability to pay and some fees can be waived or reduced for indigence, but practices vary. Monroe County officials have been analyzing the collection of pretrial fees for services like electronic monitoring to assess their impact​. It’s a delicate balance: these services cost money to provide, and requiring defendants to pay something is one way to fund them, but it shouldn’t become a barrier that undermines the goal of reducing pretrial detention.

Pros and Cons of the IRAS-Based System

Taking all of the above into account, we can summarize the key pros and cons of Indiana’s IRAS and pretrial reform:

Pros / Strengths:

• Reduced Pretrial Detention: The biggest benefit has been a drop in the number of people jailed pretrial simply because they cannot afford bail. Indiana’s jails, many of which were overcrowded, have seen relief as more low-level offenders are released under supervision. This not only alleviates jail capacity issues but also saves money (tax dollars not spent on housing low-risk inmates) and avoids the personal harm to defendants and families caused by unnecessary detention. Early outcomes show many defendants who would have been behind bars are instead at home, keeping jobs and family responsibilities, while still meeting their court obligations.
• High Court Appearance and Public Safety Rates: The IRAS-guided approach has proven effective at getting defendants to court and preventing most new crimes during pretrial. Multiple counties report appearance rates around 90–95%​, which are at or above rates under the old cash bail system. Public safety has not been compromised – the vast majority (over 90%) of released defendants are not arrested for violent offenses pending trial, and overall re-arrest rates remain low (often in the single-digit percentages for new serious crimes). This matches the experience of other jurisdictions like Washington, D.C. (90% of defendants appear and are not rearrested without using cash bail)​. In short, the risk assessment system is meeting its goals of maximizing release while maintaining high levels of compliance.

• Fairness and Data-Driven Decisions: IRAS and Rule 26 inject a greater degree of objectivity and consistency into what used to be a very subjective process. Decisions about bail are now anchored in a validated tool and transparent criteria, which helps reduce the influence of implicit biases or inconsistencies. A low-risk defendant in one county should be treated similarly to a low-risk defendant in another, rather than their fate hinging on varying local bond schedules or attitudes. There is also increased transparency – a defendant and their attorney know there’s an assessment result that can be discussed or challenged, rather than a seemingly arbitrary dollar amount. Moreover, Indiana’s continuous evaluation of the IRAS-PAT provides accountability; the tool is backed by research (e.g., the five-county validation) and updated if needed. The finding of no racial bias in outcomes so far is encouraging​, suggesting the tool may be more fair than the previous system where minorities often fared worse.

• Holistic Approach to Offender Management: Because IRAS is a system that follows an offender through the process, it has benefits beyond pretrial. For those who are convicted, the information from the pretrial assessment feeds into later assessments, contributing to better-tailored probation plans or reentry programming. The continuity can reduce duplication (if a person was assessed recently, that info can be reused within 12 months by another department)​. By identifying criminogenic needs early (like substance abuse issues via the drug-related questions), IRAS can flag individuals who would benefit from treatment or services even before trial – some jurisdictions may offer voluntary referral to treatment as a condition of release for moderate-risk defendants with drug problems, for example. In the long run, this focus on needs aims to reduce recidivism and improve outcomes for defendants, not just manage their pretrial period.

• Transparency and Accountability: Indiana’s reform, being statewide and court-driven, comes with training standards and oversight. Pretrial services agencies undergo a certification process ensuring they meet certain benchmarks. There is also an emphasis on collecting data (appearance rates, etc.) to measure performance​. All of this means the system can be continually improved. The conversation has shifted from anecdotes (“let’s detain them because of a hunch”) to metrics (“our appearance rate is 95%, how can we get to 97%?”). This data-driven culture is a pro in that it promotes evidence-based tweaks and builds public confidence when results are strong.

Cons / Concerns:

• Discretion and Variation Remain: Despite the structured tools, there is still variability in how judges use IRAS. Some may give the assessment great weight, others less so. As seen in cases like DeWees, a moderate risk score didn’t prevent a high bond; another judge might have ruled differently. There’s also variation between counties in terms of resources – not all have the same menu of pretrial supervision options, which could lead to different outcomes for similar defendants. In the early phase, some courts didn’t fully comply with the new requirements (e.g. failing to order the IRAS assessment until prompted on appeal as in Beachey​). These discrepancies can be viewed as a con, since uniform justice is the ideal. Over time, one hopes training, appellate precedents, and peer learning minimize such differences, but judicial discretion will always allow some divergence.

• Potential Bias in Risk Factors: By design, risk assessments use factors like criminal history that reflect law enforcement patterns. There is an ongoing debate nationally about whether tools like IRAS inadvertently perpetuate racial or socioeconomic biases. For example, if disadvantaged communities experience more police surveillance, their residents might accumulate more arrests and convictions, thus scoring higher on risk assessments regardless of individual circumstances. PJI’s stance is that these tools are inherently laden with biased data and “we can’t support the use of assessments anymore” because of that​. Indiana’s own experts counter that the alternative – subjective human judgment – has its own biases and that at least the tool is consistent​. This remains a con to watch: IRAS could inadvertently label certain groups as higher risk more often, and without careful checks, could reinforce disparities. So far, studies haven’t shown IRAS-PAT to be biased in outcomes​, but the perception of bias or the input biases (like poverty-related factors such as unstable housing affecting the score) are valid concerns.

• Misuse or Overreliance: The IRAS-PAT is meant to inform release conditions, not to be the sole determinant of release vs. detention​. A critique in some jurisdictions has been that officials treat the risk score as fate – e.g., automatically detaining all “high risk” defendants. This would be a misuse because even high-risk individuals might be manageable with the right conditions, and Indiana’s constitution (like most) favors release except in capital cases. Conversely, an overreliance on the tool might lead to ignoring nuances that the tool can’t capture (like a specific threat an individual made which isn’t a question on the assessment). Indiana tries to guard against this by allowing consideration of other info and by not having a hard cutoff that dictates detention. However, anytime a tool is widely used, there’s a risk some practitioners follow it rigidly without thinking. It requires ongoing training to ensure the IRAS is used as intended – as a guide alongside professional judgment, not a replacement for it.

• Resource Intensiveness: Running a pretrial services program with risk assessments, supervision, reminders, etc., requires staff and funding. Some counties might struggle to maintain sufficient pretrial officers to interview everyone promptly, or to provide all the recommended supervision (for instance, GPS devices or drug tests cost money). As Elkhart’s prosecutor noted, it’s a lot of effort to do these assessments and manage cases​. Without adequate support, there could be delays (which Rule 26 seeks to avoid) or less effective supervision (if, say, one officer is juggling too many released defendants to properly follow up). Smaller counties also face the learning curve of shifting from a “set a bond and forget it” approach to a hands-on supervisory role. This con is essentially a growing pain – the state is mitigating it through grants and support​, but implementation is uneven.

• “Bail Jail” and Financial Burdens on Defendants: As discussed, freedom often comes with conditions that can be costly. Work release programs, where a defendant is allowed to work but must live in a county-run facility, have daily fees and strict rules (miss a day of payment or break a rule and you’re back in jail). Electronic monitoring devices, like ankle GPS, frequently require the defendant to pay rental fees or monitoring fees. Indiana’s pretrial services fee statute allows monthly fees that can reach $30​, and local programs may charge even more per day for enhanced supervision​. For low-income individuals, these costs can be onerous – some advocates say this simply shifts the burden of payment from fronting a bail bond to paying over time for supervision, which can feel like an ongoing “alternative” incarceration cost. If someone cannot afford a private bail bond, they likely also will struggle to afford hundreds of dollars in supervision fees. This raises concerns about equity: Are we truly better off if a person avoids jail initially but later accumulates debt or faces incarceration for unpaid fees? Indiana law does require courts to consider ability to pay before imposing pretrial fees​, and not every defendant is charged (first-time offenders without prior convictions might be exempt, per the statute’s wording)​. Nonetheless, the practice of “user-funded” pretrial systems is a con that requires careful oversight. Some jurisdictions have started funding these programs more through government budgets to reduce reliance on defendant fees – a conversation that could be a next step in Indiana as well.

• Public Perceptions and Political Pressure: Although not a flaw in IRAS per se, it’s worth noting that bail reform efforts sometimes face political pushback, especially if a high-profile incident occurs (e.g., a defendant on pretrial release commits a serious new crime). If such an event happens, there can be pressure on judges to err on the side of detention, potentially undermining the reform. Educating the public that no system can prevent all crime and that the vast majority of IRAS-guided releases are successful is key to sustaining the reform. Indiana’s decision to collect and share data will help illustrate the overall success to stakeholders and the public. But this remains a delicate point: bail (and crime in general) can become politicized, and a data-driven system like IRAS needs continued support and understanding from the community to thrive.

In weighing these pros and cons, the consensus among many Indiana criminal justice leaders is that the pros strongly outweigh the cons, and most cons can be managed with thoughtful policy tweaks. Mary Kay Hudson, Executive Director of IOCS, noted that while the state is still refining data collection, the “3 M’s” – maximizing public safety, court appearance, and pretrial release – are the driving goals​, and early signs are positive. Even skeptics of risk assessments agree that the money bail system the reforms replaced was fraught with unfairness, so Indiana’s steps are a good-faith attempt to improve on that. The IRAS system is not perfect nor a panacea, but it represents a significant advancement in how the state handles the crucial stage between arrest and trial, with many lives improved as a result.

Conclusion and Future Discussion

Indiana’s Indiana Risk Assessment System (IRAS) and Criminal Rule 26 have together created a more just and evidence-based pretrial process. From the moment of arrest, an accused person’s situation is evaluated on individualized factors related to risk, rather than solely on the charge or their ability to post cash bail. This system carries through to sentencing and beyond, ensuring that at each phase, decisions are informed by an understanding of the person’s risk and needs. The reform’s intent – to protect public safety while upholding the presumption of innocence – is being realized through high appearance rates and a reduction in unnecessary pretrial jailing. Yet, the system must continuously earn trust by demonstrating fairness and addressing any shortcomings that arise.

As we’ve seen, IRAS is not without its challenges. Concerns about consistent implementation, potential biases, and the financial impact on defendants warrant ongoing attention. These will be important topics for policymakers, researchers, and the community to keep discussing. The criminal justice system is dynamic, and Indiana’s approach will likely evolve as more data and feedback become available. For instance, state leaders might consider standardizing fee waivers for those who truly cannot pay for pretrial supervision, to prevent a two-tiered system from developing. Likewise, training and perhaps even calibration of the risk tool (adjusting questions or weights) could be employed if evidence ever shows disparities or predictive weaknesses.

For readers interested in digging deeper, there are several follow-up topics that could be explored in future blogs or forums:

• The Financial Strain on Pretrial Defendants: A closer look at the costs associated with pretrial release programs – fees for electronic monitoring, drug testing, work release housing, etc. – and their impact. Are defendants being set up to succeed or are some failing simply because they can’t afford compliance? This topic could profile individuals’ experiences on pretrial supervision (successes and struggles) and examine how different counties handle fees. It could also discuss possible reforms, such as subsidizing these programs to eliminate “user fees,” or creating sliding scale payments. Essentially, this is the “Bail Jail” conversation: ensuring that in fixing cash bail, we haven’t introduced a new kind of economic burden on the accused.
• Alternatives to Money Bail: What’s Next? Indiana has made strides, but what other innovations could further improve pretrial justice? This follow-up could compare Indiana’s model with other jurisdictions that have gone even further – for example, Illinois’s recent abolition of cash bail entirely (the SAFE-T Act) and how they manage risk without monetary conditions, or New Jersey’s ongoing experience years after reform. It could also explore community-based supports as complements or alternatives: programs like court notification systems (text reminders have proven very effective), voluntary recovery services, or bail funds for the few cases where cash bail is still used. The role of technology (like smartphone check-in apps or geo-location monitoring that is less intrusive than ankle bracelets) might be examined. Essentially, this topic invites discussion on how to continue balancing presumption of innocence with public safety, possibly moving toward a future where money bail is obsolete nationwide and risk assessment and/or preventive detention hearings (for truly dangerous cases) are the norm.
• Long-Term Outcomes and Recidivism: Another interesting angle is to follow defendants after their cases conclude. Did IRAS accurately predict their risk in the long run? How do those who were released pretrial fare compared to those who were detained (research often shows that even short pretrial jail stays can increase chances of reoffending, due to destabilization)? This could leverage Indiana’s data as it matures, to see if pretrial reforms contribute to lower recidivism and better life outcomes (jobs retained, families kept intact). It ties back to the broader goal of recidivism reduction that IRAS’s creators envisioned​

In summary, Indiana’s experience with IRAS and bail reform reflects a growing trend to make criminal justice smarter and fairer. The state’s commitment to evidence-based practices is yielding promising results, though continuous improvement is essential. By remaining vigilant about issues of fairness and ensuring the human element – understanding each defendant’s story – remains in the loop, Indiana can serve as a model of how to implement risk assessment in a way that enhances justice. The conversation is far from over; as data rolls in and society’s values evolve, so too will the approaches to pretrial justice. Stakeholders, from courts to community members, should stay engaged in this dialogue. After all, the pretrial phase is where the principle of “innocent until proven guilty” is most tested in practice, and getting it right is fundamental to the integrity of our legal system.

Bibliography

1. Indiana Supreme Court, Criminal Rule 26 (Pretrial Release) – Text of Rule 26 as adopted (2016), outlining the presumption of release without money bail and use of risk assessments​.

2. Indiana Code § 35-33-8-0.5 (2017) – Indiana statute directing the adoption of a statewide evidence-based risk assessment system for pretrial release​.

3. Indiana Code § 35-33-8-3.3 (Pretrial Services Fee) – Indiana law permitting courts to charge certain fees to defendants under pretrial supervision (with ability-to-pay considerations)​.

4. “Studies show initial success in state pretrial release assessments” – The Indiana Lawyer, Aug. 5, 2020 (Olivia Covington). News article reporting on early studies of IRAS-PAT in Indiana, finding good predictive accuracy and no evidence of racial bias, while noting slight increases in re-arrest with broader release​.

5. “IndyBar: Pretrial reform in Marion County – How is it working so far?” – The Indiana Lawyer, Aug. 4, 2021 (Hon. Amy Jones). Firsthand account of Marion County’s implementation of Rule 26 and IRAS-PAT, detailing process and reporting a 95% appearance rate and 94% non-arrest rate for released defendants​.

6. “COA: Trial court failed to meet pretrial risk assessment requirements” – The Indiana Lawyer, Sept. 28, 2021 (Jordan Morey). Article summarizing the Court of Appeals decision in Beachey v. State, where a trial court’s denial of bail reduction was vacated for not considering an IRAS-PAT report as required​.

7. “Supreme Court affirms trial court’s denial of bail modification for teen” – The Indiana Lawyer, Feb. 3, 2022 (Marilyn Odendahl). Article on the Indiana Supreme Court ruling in DeWees v. State, upholding a high bond despite a moderate IRAS score, and emphasizing judges’ discretion in light of violent facts​.

8. “Pretrial release, 7 years in: State data still coming, but counties showing improvement” – The Indiana Lawyer, Nov. 8, 2023 (Daniel Carson). Overview of Indiana’s progress seven years after adopting Rule 26, with input from state officials. Includes local outcome statistics (e.g., Elkhart County’s appearance and re-arrest rates by risk level)​.

9. Indiana Office of Court Services – Pretrial Release Resources (IN.gov). Contains Indiana’s Pretrial Services Rules, and research reports such as the IRAS-PAT Validation Studies for various counties, the Process Evaluation of the IRAS-PAT Pilot (2017), and the Predictive Bias and Differential Prediction reports​. These materials provide in-depth data on IRAS-PAT performance and ongoing efforts to ensure its validity and fairness.

10. Indiana Risk Assessment System – Policy and Procedures Manual (2010). The original IRAS manual developed for the Judicial Conference of Indiana​. It details the five IRAS tools (Pretrial, Community Supervision, etc.), scoring guides, and the rationale behind each item. This was used to summarize the IRAS-PAT factors and scoring methodology in this blog.

11. Maryland Attorney General’s Office – Bail Reform FAQ (2017)​. Provides context from a neighboring reform effort, including statistics from D.C. (90% appearance/no re-arrest without cash bail) and Kentucky (increased appearance rate and decreased new crimes after adopting risk assessments), highlighting that Indiana’s results are consistent with national trends.

12. Arnold Ventures – “The Facts on New Jersey Bail Reform” (Mar. 1, 2023)​. Fact sheet describing New Jersey’s elimination of cash bail and the positive outcomes (20% reduction in pretrial jail population, crime rates down). Cited to compare and contrast Indiana’s reforms with New Jersey’s model and results.

13. Pretrial Justice Institute (Meghan Guevara’s statements) – Quoted in The Indiana Lawyer (2020) expressing PJI’s position against pretrial risk assessments due to bias concerns​. Provides the counterpoint to using tools like IRAS, underscoring the importance of vigilance about potential biases.

14. Monroe County Community Corrections – Community Alternative Supervision Program (CASP) Description​. Local information on a program used for pretrial supervision (among other purposes) with a schedule of fees ($6–$16/day for various levels of electronic monitoring). Used to exemplify the “Bail Jail” issue of fees for pretrial release conditions.